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Abstract 
Difficulties in understanding the mental states of others are considered to be a 
core cognitive feature of autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Traditional false-belief tasks 
were not suitable to measure mind reading in adolescents and adults with ASD and were 
replaced by so-called more ‘advanced’ tasks. A first series of tasks included the 
presentation of static stimuli in the visual or auditory modality. More recently, more 
dynamic, naturalistic tasks were developed. The most ecologically valid task to measure 
mind-reading is probably the empathic accuracy paradigm. Research with advanced 
mind-reading tests has demonstrated that high-functioning adults with ASD should not be 
underestimated since they may have good and in some case very good mind-reading 
skills. Impairments are most obvious when an unstructured, dynamic and naturalistic task 
is being used. 
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How impaired is mind reading in high-functioning adolescents and adults with autism? 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of people with autism is their strange way 
of making contact with other people (Kanner, 1943). The social and communicative 
abnormalities that are characteristic of the disorder according to the DSM-IV-TR criteria 
(APA, 2000) have often been linked to an impaired theory of mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, 
Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). ToM can be described as the ability to attribute 
mental states, such as intentions, beliefs and desires, to oneself and to others (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Difficulties in understanding the mental states of others are 
considered to be a core cognitive feature of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Baron-
Cohen, 2001a). In its narrow use, the term theory of mind refers only to the ability to 
impute cognitive or volitional states to others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). In its 
broader use however, the term also refers to mind reading, that covers more direct on-line 
processing of mental state information including both verbal and nonverbal cues, 
thoughts and feelings.  
Mind-reading deficits in autism spectrum conditions appear to occur early in 
lifetime, with joint attention deficits as one of the precursors, and seem to be universal 
(Baron-Cohen, 2001b). Frith, Happé, and Siddons (1994) found that a subgroup of 
children with autism who passed standard theory-of-mind tasks gave evidence of 
mentalizing in their everyday day life behaviour, as measured with the Vineland Scales of 
Adaptive Behaviour (Sparrow, Balla, & Cichetti, 1984). It should be noted, however, that 
children with autism who pass ToM-tasks were rated by their teachers to be even worse 
than younger typically developing ToM-failers in applying mind reading in everyday 
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social interaction and conversation (Peterson, Garnett, Kelly, & Attwood, 2009).  
Baron-Cohen (2001a & b) suggested that developmentally appropriate tests are 
needed in order to reveal the manifestations of the ToM abnormalities in people with 
autism. In this paper we will describe the evolution of the instruments used to measure 
ToM abilities adequately in individuals with ASD. This methodological evolution started 
with the use of false-belief tasks in children with autism. As a second step these simple 
tasks were adapted with the ‘advanced’ mind-reading tasks as the result. Today, a more 
naturalistic design for measuring empathic abilities can be found in the empathic 
accuracy task that has been used primarily in adults with ASD.   
False belief tasks 
During the first years of research within the ToM domain, a lot of studies focused 
on the perspective taking abilities of children with autism, who obviously experience 
difficulties in their ToM competence (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Leekam & Perner, 1991). In these studies, researchers mainly used standard laboratory 
first-order false-belief tasks, which only involve inferring one person’s mental state 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). These tasks require understanding that different people can 
think differently about the same situation and may therefore hold a false belief (Baron-
Cohen, 2001b). The most popular task is the so-called changed-location false-belief task 
in which an object is relocated by one character during the absence of another character 
who knows the original location. While typically developing 4-year-old children are able 
to pass these tests, the proportion of children with autism found to fail these tasks varies 
from 40% to 85% (Happé, 1995). Many young children with autism, even in the absence 
of intellectual disability, apparently do not understand that another’s mental 
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representation of the situation is different from their own until their teens or even later 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Happé, 1995; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). 
Moreover, with the exception of somewhat older, high-functioning children (e.g., 
Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996), they all fail second-order 
tests that involve the subject's reasoning about what one person thinks about another 
person's thoughts (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Second-order false belief tests involve 
considering embedded mental states, e.g., what John thinks that Mary thinks (Baron-
Cohen, 2001b).  
Nevertheless, some individuals with high-functioning autism or Asperger 
Syndrome even pass the second-order false-belief tasks in their teens or early adulthood 
(Bowler, 1992; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991). Given the fact that 
typically developing children pass these tests around the age of 6 or 7, there is however 
no reason to conclude that social-cognitive understanding of adolescents or adults with 
ASD is intact. But the observation has given rise to a few more challenging so-called 
‘advanced’ ToM tasks, which make it possible to cope with possible ceiling effects in the 
simple ToM tasks (Happé, 1994).  
Advanced Tasks 
One of the first advanced ToM measures was the “Strange Stories Task” 
developed by Happé (1994). This task requires subjects to make inferences about the 
mental states of story characters. It includes concepts such as white lie and double bluff. 
Since these kinds of tasks appear to be highly correlated with verbal IQ (Kaland et al., 
2002), their usefulness as a tool for the assessment of social cognition is probably rather 
limited.  
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Another influential task that has been proffered as an advanced theory-of-mind 
test is the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (Eyes Test), used in high-functioning 
adults with autism or AS (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, et al., 1997). It involves inferring other 
people’s mental states from a photograph of their eye region. The original adult Eyes Test 
was revised in 2001 (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and in the 
same year an adaptation of the test was used in a study with children with AS (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001). Research in adults with ASD, 
using the Eyes Test, yielded mixed results. In some studies, adults with ASD showed 
deficits on this task (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & 
Jolliffe, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill et al., 2001), while in other studies, 
where other facial pictures were used, adults with ASD performed as well as controls on 
the Eyes Test (Ponnet, Roeyers, Buysse, De Clercq, & Van der Heyden, 2004; Roeyers, 
Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001). Two studies with children with ASD (10- to 14-year 
olds in Back, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2007; 8- to 14-year olds in Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Spong, et al., 2001) showed impairment on the Eyes Task in the group of children with 
ASD. However, in a sample with slightly older children (11- to 15- year olds), Back et al. 
(2007) found no evidence for inferiority in interpreting mental states from the eyes in 
children with ASD.  
It can however be questioned whether the Eyes task measures the ability to 
recognize mental states of others and to what extent the test relates to everyday social 
interaction (see Johnston, Miles, & McKinlay, 2009). The limitations that have been 
identified suggest that the test is not so advanced as originally thought and that it lacks 
ecological validity (Ponnet et al., 2004). The same is true for ‘single-modality’ tests that 
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require inferring people’s emotions from their voice tone (Rutherford, Baron-Cohen, & 
Wheelwright, 2002) or providing mental-state explanations for the movement of 
geometric shapes such as triangles in animated cartoons (e.g., Castelli, Frith, Happé, & 
Frith, 2002).  
Using dynamic facial stimuli may give a more accurate measure of mind-reading 
competence as it simulates the demands of daily social experience (Back et al., 2007; 
Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002). In studies with typically developing 
persons, better performance on emotion recognition tasks was found when dynamic faces 
were used, in comparison with static faces (Harwood, Hall, & Shinkfield, 1999; Wehrle, 
Kaiser, Schmidt, & Scherer, 2000). Similar findings were obtained with individuals with 
ASD (Back et al., 2007). This ‘dynamic advantage’ has been attributed to additional 
information, typically for dynamic interactions, such as temporal cues (Back et al., 2007).  
Making use of film fragments in mind-reading tasks is a first step to meet the 
shortcomings of the static or unimodal ToM tasks. Instruments such as the Awkward 
Moments Test (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000), the Reading the Mind in 
Films Task (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006), the Movie for the Assessment of 
Social Cognition (MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006) and the Animated Theory of Mind 
Inventory for Children (ATOMIC; Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008) use film scenes in a 
multimodal, dynamic task to assess recognition of a wide variety of complex emotions 
and mental states. On these tasks, both adults and children with ASD appear to exhibit 
difficulties in social cognition (Heavey et al., 2000; Dziobek et al., 2006; Golan et al., 
2006, 2008). It should be noted that gains that were made with respect to increased 
approximation of everyday mind reading, resulted in a decreased pureness of the tests 
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since movies also inevitably involve executive functions and central coherence (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, et al., 1997). Moreover, unlike in real-life situations, subjects are 
permitted to use as much time as they need to make inferences of other persons’ thoughts 
and feelings. In addition, like in the Eyes task, these mind-reading measures show acted 
emotions and mental states and no ‘real’ interactions and as such they do not 
acknowledge the difference between genuine and posed expressions of mental states. In 
addition, the correct answers are generated by non-impaired judges by means of 
consensus. The impact of the test designers with their social norms and conventions may 
be substantial and is certainly a potential bias (Johnston et al., 2009). 
  
Empathic accuracy task 
A more ecologically valid and naturalistic way of measuring mind-reading ability 
was found in the social psychological research literature on social cognition. It is 
provided by the empathic accuracy design of Ickes and colleagues (Ickes, 1993; Ickes, 
Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990). Good evidence for both the reliability and the 
validity of this method has been provided (Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995). 
Empathic accuracy is the degree to which an individual is successful in the “everyday 
mind reading” he does whenever he attempts to infer another person’s thoughts and 
feelings (Ickes, 1997).  
In the standard stimulus paradigm, individual participants each view the same 
standard set of videotaped interactions and try to infer the thoughts and feelings of the 
same set of target persons (Marangoni et al., 1995). Roeyers et al. (2001) used this 
paradigm with adults with ASD. They made two videot
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opposite-sex young adults participating in a genuine initial conversation between 
strangers. The interactions were covertly videotaped and after the session, each of the 
four young adults was instructed to make a complete log of all the unexpressed thoughts 
and feelings that he or she had during the interaction session. This resulted in two 
stimulus tapes and a whole range of thought/feeling entries for both tapes.  
A group of young adults with ASD and an individually matched control group 
viewed both tapes. An experimenter interrupted the stimulus tapes at each of the points at 
which the targets had previously reported having had a thought or feeling. The 
participants' task was to record their own inferences about the nature of the specific 
thought or feeling being reported by the target at that point. Empathic accuracy scores 
were computed by comparing each participant's inference with the corresponding 
thought/feeling entry obtained from the targets on the basis of the logic and procedures 
developed by Ickes and his colleagues (Ickes, 2003). Subjects with ASD performed 
significantly worse than the control group on one of the two tapes.  
Although it was not the intention to manipulate the videotapes, the conversation in 
the first videotape, where there was no difference in empathic accuracy between groups, 
was structured around one topic (a board game) and appeared to be more concrete and 
predictable than that in the second one. The findings were replicated in a second study 
using the same stimulus tapes with adults with Asperger syndrome (Ponnet et al., 2004). 
Again differences between the target and the control group were only found for the 
second, less structured, tape. IQ was measured in this study, but empathic accuracy of the 
clinical group was not related to intelligence. 
In a next study, two new stimulus tapes were produced with ‘getting acquainted’ 
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conversations between two strangers. However, this time, the structure of both videotapes 
was manipulated in such a way that one tape was more structured than the other one. 
While in the first tape the naturally occurring initial conversation between two strangers 
was recorded, the participants in the second videotape were told that it was required that 
they got to know each other personally before starting the experiment in which they 
thought they would be involved. In order to become acquainted with each other in a 
decent and less stressful manner, the experimenter proposed to leave the room for a short 
period. Before leaving, he gave the targets an eight-point list with questions they surely 
had to know from each other. It was found that structure of the situation clearly matters 
for the mind-reading abilities of subjects with ASD (Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, & De 
Clercq, 2008). The empathic accuracy scores of young adults with ASD and typically 
developing controls were only significantly different when subjects had to infer the 
thoughts and feelings of other persons in the less structured and more chaotic 
conversation in the first tape. There was no association between performance and IQ in 
the participants with ASD. 
The abovementioned studies suggest that the standard stimulus empathic accuracy 
paradigm is a promising and valuable method to study the mind-reading abilities of adults 
with ASD (see also Beaumont & Sofronoff, 2008). However, this design is still different 
from everyday mind reading since participants serve only as perceivers and not as targets 
and they infer thoughts and feelings of people with whom they do not interact. This is not 
the case when an alternative empathic accuracy design is used: the dyadic interaction 
design. In this paradigm, each participant is an active and interacting member of a dyad 
instead of being a passive observer. Ponnet, Buysse, Roeyers, and De Corte (2005) 
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developed a study in which high-functioning adults with ASD, with above average 
intellectual abilities were videotaped with a concealed camera during an initial 
conversation with a typically developing stranger. Afterwards, they had to infer the 
unexpressed thoughts and feelings of the other person in the dyad. The participants with 
ASD did not differ from the typically developing participants in the ability to infer the 
thoughts and feelings of their interaction partner. Further analyses revealed that this was 
not due to the fact that the participants with ASD had unusual or strange thoughts and 
feelings that were difficult to infer by their typically developing interaction partner. The 
finding that adults with ASD performed so well in this study is probably due to the fact 
that they were able, to some extent, to structure the conversation they were involved in. 
The level of performance was not related to the IQ of the participants. 
Although the dyadic interaction design is probably the most ecologically valid 
method that has been used up till now to measure mind-reading skills in ASD, it still 
differs from any real life social situation in several ways. Most importantly, the 
participants had to infer the thoughts or feelings of their interaction partner while they 
were viewing the videotape of their own conversation for a second time and they were 
allowed to use as much time as needed. The demands of daily life do not permit us to 
review our interactions and expect us to make quick and immediate inferences about the 
thoughts and feelings of our interaction partners.  
 
Empathic accuracy in adolescents with ASD 
While a lot of attention has been paid to school-aged children and, more recently, 
to adults, adolescents with ASD have been largely neglected in the mind-reading 
literature.  This is also the case for their non-impaired peers. From a developmental point 
 12
of view however, information on mind-reading skills in youngsters is of great interest.  
Gleason and colleagues extended the standard stimulus paradigm of empathic accuracy 
by studying typically developing adolescents (Gleason, Jensen-Campbell, & Ickes, 2009). 
Their results revealed that teenagers who obtained higher empathic accuracy scores were 
more likely to have better quality friendships, and experienced lower levels of relational 
victimization. Additionally, adolescents who were at highest risk for internalizing and 
social problems had low scores on the empathic accuracy task, and on peer dimensions 
such as number of friends and friendship quality. It was suggested that empathic accuracy 
in childhood relationships might be a buffering mechanism that protects children against 
the development of impaired peer relationships and adjustment problems (Gleason et al., 
2009).  
Demurie, De Corel, and Roeyers (submitted), recently used the standard stimulus 
paradigm with adolescents with ASD between 11 and 17 years of age. They were 
compared with age-mates with ADHD and with a group of typically developing 
adolescents. The standard stimulus tape in this study consisted of ten short fragments 
with interactions between five dyads of adolescents who were initially strangers to each 
other. Adolescents with ASD clearly experienced difficulties in inferring the thoughts and 
feelings of others. They performed significantly worse than typically developing 
adolescents. The difference with the group with ADHD was, however, not significant. 
Interestingly, the empathic accuracy of the adolescents in the ASD group was positively 
correlated with age, but not with IQ.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
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 Apparently the majority of young children with ASD fail traditional mind-reading 
tasks. High-functioning adults with ASD, on the contrary, show only difficulties when 
more advanced or naturalistic tasks are being used. Their mind-reading impairments 
appear to be more subtle than those of young children. Whether this means that mind-
reading abilities improve spontaneously or through teaching and training when 
individuals with ASD grow older, is still unclear. Research in adolescents is scarce, but 
the available evidence usually reveals more pronounced difficulties than in adults. 
Together with the findings that empathic abilities are correlated with age in children and 
in adolescents with ASD (Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Stegge, 2008; 
Demurie et al., submitted), this may indicate an improvement of mind-reading skills with 
growing age. More studies with adolescents and especially longitudinal studies from 
adolescence or earlier to adulthood are needed to shed more light on this issue. The fact 
that a complex paradigm as the empathic accuracy design was successfully used with 
adolescents with ASD, is promising for future research.  
 Although clear or somewhat subtle differences with typically developing persons 
were detected in studies with adolescents and adults with ASD, we should well be aware 
that these are all differences on a group level. In all the samples where the standard 
stimulus paradigm has been used, there were individuals with ASD who performed as 
well as their typically developing peers. Apart from age in the study with adolescents, 
however, we were not yet able to detect a characteristic that clearly distinguishes the 
empathic persons with ASD from those with poorer mind-reading skills. Detailed 
analyses in the Ponnet et al. (2008) study revealed that young adults with ASD use to a 
large extent the same strategies as typically developing persons to infer other people’s 
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thoughts and feelings. This brings us to the unresolved issue as to whether the 
development of ToM in children with ASD is delayed, deviant or both (Serra, Loth, Van 
Geert, Hurkens, & Minderaa, 2002). In any case, some older individuals with ASD seem 
to have very similar mind-reading skills compared to typically developing adolescents 
and adults. This suggests that at least for a subgroup of high-functioning individuals with 
ASD, ToM-development is rather delayed than deviant. 
 Different studies with adults with ASD have shown the importance of structure to 
the performance on a mind-reading task. It is well known that people with ASD prefer 
structured situations and activities with clear rules and that their symptoms are less 
obvious in a highly structured context (e.g., Howlin, 1997; Mesibov, 1992). Apparently it 
is also much easier for them to infer thoughts and feelings of people who are engaged in a 
structured, quite predictable conversation, than of those involved in an unstructured, more 
chaotic interaction. It can be considered that all participants are familiar with the script of 
the structured interactions in the different empathic accuracy studies (i.e., an initial 
conversation of the getting acquainted type). This familiarity might be derived from 
experience or by having learned the script previously. Therefore, particular cues in the 
situation may lead to the retrieval of information from memory about similar situations to 
that of the target person, as well as social scripts or other socially relevant knowledge 
(see Karniol, 1995). Very little is known about the capabilities of subjects with ASD of 
using scripts, although script-fading procedures are increasingly being employed in 
interventions with children (e.g., Brown, Krantz, McClannahan, & Poulson, 2008). While 
a small study of Trillingsgaard (1999) suggested that children with autism have 
significantly fewer well-organized scripts for familiar social routines (such as celebrate a 
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birthday or make a cake) than control children, the results of a study of Volden and 
Johnston (1999) suggested that the basic scriptal knowledge of children with autism 
appears to be intact. The question remains whether these results can be generalised to 
adults with ASD and to what extent scriptal knowledge of adults is related to their mind-
reading performance. 
 The so-called advanced mind-reading tests have demonstrated that high-
functioning adults with ASD should not be underestimated since they may have good and 
in some cases very good mind-reading skills. This does not imply however, that they 
show appropriate social behaviour. Good mind-reading skills are often necessary but 
never sufficient for successful social functioning in everyday life (Astington, 2003). 
 Mind-reading impairments are most obvious when an unstructured, dynamic and 
naturalistic task is being used which circumvents the use of non-social heuristic strategies 
(Frith et al., 1994). The empathic accuracy tasks that have been described can be further 
developed to get a better insight into the nature and development of mind reading in 
individuals with ASD. They have the advantage of working with genuine mental states 
and allow to take into account and to manipulate contextual factors (Johnston et al., 
2009). More recent work with typically developing adults suggests that empathic 
accuracy may depend more on the characteristics of the targets, than on those of the 
perceivers (e.g., Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008). Our findings that the performance of 
adults with ASD is largely associated with the degree of structure of the conversation, 
rather than with IQ, may suggest that also in high-functioning ASD the focus should be 
more on dispositions of targets than on the identification of dispositions of accurate 
perceivers, although the role of scriptal knowledge should certainly be taken into account. 
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The recent findings in typically developing adults that auditory, and especially verbal 
information is more critical to empathic accuracy than visual information and that target 
expressivity predicts empathic accuracy (Zaki et al., 2009) is in line with this view and 
offers testable hypotheses for future research with individuals with ASD. Examining 
whether more structured conversations provide clearer verbal cues to internal states and 
therefore allow perceivers with ASD to improve their empathic accuracy (see Zaki et al., 
2009) is most probably the next step to take.  
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